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Civil Procedure-PERSONAL JURISDICTION-DUE PROCESS LIMITS
THE REACH OF FLORIDA'S LONG-ARM STATUTE IN BRINGING CONTRACT
DEFENDANTS TO THE HOME OF THE WHOPPER-Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985)
To protect their citizens from wrongdoing by nonresidents, state
legislatures have enacted statutes giving their courts personal juris-
diction over nonresidents who cause certain injuries within their
territory. In contract disputes, long-arm jurisdiction in Florida
may be predicated upon section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes.1
This provision vests in Florida courts personal jurisdiction over
nonresidents who breach a contract in Florida "by failing to per-
form acts required by the contract to be performed in this state."2
This criterion was intended to provide an objective determination
of whether a defendant is within the reach of the long-arm power
of Florida courts. It has been used to assert jurisdiction based on a
lesser degree of contact with Florida than is required under an-
other provision that also may apply in contract-related disputes. s
In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,4 the United States Supreme
Court held that the United States District Court for the Southern
1. FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (1985) provides in part:
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally
or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby
submits himself and, if he is a natural person, his personal representative to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the
doing of any of the following acts:
(g) Breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the
contract to be performed in this state.
2. FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(g) (1985).
3. See, e.g., Lacy v. Force V Corp., 403 So. 2d 1050, 1052 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
FLA. STAT. § 48.181 (1985) provides that any nonresident individual or foreign business
organization that accepts the privilege of carrying on a business in Florida impliedly ap-
points the secretary of state as his agent for service of process in any dispute arising out of a
transaction incidental to that business, and that service in that manner would be just as
valid as if process were served personally.
In Devaney v. Rumsch, 228 So. 2d 904, 907 (Fla. 1969), Justice Boyd stated the purpose of
this provision to be:
[T]hat any individual or corporation who has exercised the privilege of practicing
a profession or dealing in goods, services or property, whether in a professional or
nonprofessional capacity, within the State in anticipation of economic gain, be
regarded as operating a business or business venture for the purpose of service
under Florida Statutes § 48.181, F.S.A., in suits resulting from their activity
within the State.
For a discussion of the differences between § 48.181 and § 48.193, see Rohr, Personal
Jurisdiction in Florida: Some Problems and Proposals, 5 NOVA L.J. 365, 371 (1981) (the two
statutes substantially overlap but are not duplicative because they are tied to different
methods of service of process).
4. 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985).
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District of Florida could exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant in a breach of contract case pursuant to section
48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes. In doing so, the Court noted that
the mere existence of a contract could not automatically establish
contacts with a forum state sufficient to meet the constitutional
limitations on long-arm statutes. The Court held that the nature
and extent of all of the nonresident defendant's relevant activities
should be examined to determine whether he purposefully estab-
lished contacts with the forum state. The Court thus rejected the
use of mechanistic tests focusing solely on the place of perform-
ance of a contract or its breach when determining whether the in-
vocation of long-arm jurisdiction meets constitutional muster. This
result spurned the approach frequently taken by courts applying
Florida law.
The purpose of this Note is to examine the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Burger King. The Court's analysis in this case will then
be contrasted with that in a line of state and federal court deci-
sions in which section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes, was invoked
to acquire personal jurisdiction over nonresidents based on the ex-
istence of a contract requiring performance in Florida. Finally, the
influence of the Burger King decision on recent Florida decisions
will be reviewed.
I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION: THE DUE PROCESS ISSUES
For jurisdiction to be exercised over a nonresident defendant, his
contact with the forum state must not only bring him within the
terms of its long-arm statute for service of process, but prove suffi-
cient in degree to satisfy constitutional mandates. In a series of
cases the Supreme Court has determined that the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause protects litigants from being un-
reasonably forced to defend themselves in distant forums.
The Supreme Court's 1945 decision in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington" is the foundation for modern jurisdictional analysis.
International Shoe, a Delaware corporation with headquarters in
St. Louis, Missouri, maintained no offices in the state of Washing-
ton. The company's only contact with the state was through the
employment of several sales representatives who worked in Wash-
ington, soliciting orders for the company's shoes and earning com-
missions on their sales. The shoes were then shipped from out-of-
5. Id. at 2185.
6. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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state manufacturers to the purchasers. Washington claimed the
company owed a percentage of the commissions paid to the sales
representatives to its unemployment compensation fund and
brought suit to recover the unpaid amounts. Finding that the "reg-
ular and systematic" operations of the company within the state
were sufficient to constitute "doing business," the Washington Su-
preme Court held the company was subject to suit in the state's
courts.8 On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision,
stating:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice."9
The sales representatives engaged in continuous activity within
the state of Washington spanning a number of years and involving
a substantial volume of merchandise. During this period the com-
pany enjoyed the benefits and protections of the laws of the state.
The Court determined that it was reasonable for Washington to
require that International Shoe subject itself to the judicial
processes of that state.
While the decision in International Shoe established a basis for
the protection of due process rights, its minimum contacts, fair
play, and substantial justice criteria were inherently ambiguous. As
states increased their use of long-arm jurisdiction, further judicial
clarification was needed. In Hanson v. Denckla,10 the Court elabo-
rated its standards. Hanson concerned the rights to a trust created
in Delaware by a settlor who later moved to Florida. The Florida
Supreme Court declared the trust invalid. The Delaware Supreme
Court held that the Florida decision was not entitled to full faith
and credit because the Florida court had lacked personal jurisdic-
tion over the trust company or jurisdiction over the property."
7. Id. at 314. This system ensured that the company would not be subject to in rem
jurisdiction. See McDermott, Personal Jurisdiction: The Hidden Agendas in the Supreme
Court Decisions, 10 VT. L. REv. 1, 6 (1985).
8. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 314.
9. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1937)). In International
Shoe, the Court replaced the previous tests of "consent" and "presence" for the validity of
personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants with an analysis focusing on the quality of
the defendant's contacts with the forum. Id. at 317.
10. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
11. Id. at 238.
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The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Delaware decision
and reversed the Florida decision.12
The contacts between the trust company and the state of Florida
arose through the settlor, domiciled in Florida, exercising her
power of appointment under the trust. The Court determined this
contact was too insubstantial to support personal jurisdiction. "It
is essential in each case that there be some act by which the de-
fendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting ac-
tivities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and pro-
tections of its laws.' 3 The purposeful availment requirement
protects nonresidents from being forced to defend suits in distant
forums based on fortuitous or passive contacts with a state. Once a
party has purposefully availed himself of the privilege of con-
ducting business within a state, he should foresee the possiblity of
having to defend a suit there and may not claim unfairness or sur-
prise when required to do so. Subsequent case law has determined
that foreseeability is to be examined from the perspective of the
defendant and not of the plaintiff.14
The Supreme Court revisited the minimum contacts doctrine in
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,"5 discussing the quantum of
contact required. In World-Wide Volkswagen, a purchaser of an
automobile in New York was injured in a car accident in
Oklahoma. The purchaser brought suit against the manufacturer,
importer, distributor, and retailer. The retailer and distributor
contested personal jurisdiction on due process grounds. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court found that the automobile was intended
by design to be mobile, thus affording the manufacturer and dis-
tributor ample notice that it might be used in Oklahoma.16 This
notice, together with the income obtained from the sale of the au-
tomobiles that were used nationwide, provided the basis for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants. 7
The Supreme Court rejected the Oklahoma court's reasoning as
12. Id. at 256.
13. Id. at 253.
14. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). In Shaffer, the Court concluded
that International Shoe's fairness precepts were applicable to quasi in rem actions. Id. at
212. The Court also reiterated that choice of law findings would not determine jurisdictional
issues. Id. at 215. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens emphasized the requirement of
fair notice. Id. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring).
15. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
16. Id. at 290.
17. Id. at 290-91. The Supreme Court found that the Oklahoma court had not separately
considered the statutory and constitutional standards for jurisdiction. Id. at 290.
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it was applied to the distributor and retailer because it would
mean, in effect, that every seller would have "appoint[ed] the chat-
tel as his agent for service of process."' 8 The Court concluded that
the foreseeability which is required under due process is not the
foreseeability that a product will enter the market in a particular
state, but that the defendant should anticipate defending a suit in
the particular forum.' 9 The Court found that the distributor's con-
duct did not meet this foreseeability test.
The emphasis the Court has placed on substantial contacts has
not prevented it from finding sufficient contacts based on a single
transaction within the forum state. In McGee v. International Life
Insurance Co.,"0 an insurance company operating out of Texas
mailed a reinsurance certificate to a California resident. The corpo-
ration maintained no offices in California, did not regularly solicit
business there, and only insured the California resident because it
had assumed the obligations of an Arizona insurance company.2"
The Supreme Court determined that the Texas insurance company
had sufficient contacts with California to support personal jurisdic-
tion in a California court because the insurance contract had been
delivered to a California resident, and because that resident had
paid premiums on the policy.2 2 Courts have cited McGee in sup-
port of the proposition that nonresident defendants may be subject
to the personal jurisdiction of a foreign state based on a single con-
tract,23 although the decision was arguably limited a year later by
the purposeful availment standard of Hanson.2 4
II. Burger King
Against this backdrop of minimum contacts and basic fairness
requirements, the Supreme Court in its 1985 Term considered the
case of two Burger King franchisees, both of whom were Michigan
residents, who had been sued in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida on a contract claim.
18. Id. at 296.
19. Id. at 297.
20. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
21. Id. at 223.
22. Id. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Black noted a trend toward expanded juris-
diction in state courts, in part due to the nationalization of commerce. Id. at 222-23.
23. See, e.g., In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir.
1972).
24. See, e.g., Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596
(7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980).
1986]
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A. The Facts and the Trial
John Rudzewicz and Brian MacShara decided in the fall of 1978
to apply to the Burger King Corp. for a franchise operation in the
Detroit area. They submitted an application to Burger King's dis-
trict office in Michigan, which forwarded the application to the
company's main office in Miami, Florida.25
Burger King conducts its franchise business according to what it
describes as a comprehensive "Burger King System." Franchisees
are licensed to use Burger King trademarks and service marks for
twenty years and are supplied with extensive proprietary informa-
tion as well as managerial training, marketing, and advertising as-
sistance throughout the relationship. 6 In return, the franchisees
pay an initial franchising fee and agree to submit monthly royalty
and rental payments. The franchisees must also abide by Burger
King's comprehensive regulation of virtually every aspect of their
operation. The system is administered from Burger King's Miami
headquarters and from regional offices throughout the country.
The Miami office sets corporate policy and intervenes directly only
when there are major problems with franchisees. Regional offices
are responsible for direct supervision of the restaurants. 28
Rudzewicz and MacShara negotiated for approximately four
months with Burger King representatives in Michigan and Florida.
As negotiations progressed, the Miami headquarters took the lead
role in resolving disputes.29 After obtaining limited concessions
from the corporation, the partners agreed to take over an existing
restaurant in Drayton Plains, Michigan. MacShara attended
mandatory training courses in Miami, new equipment was pur-
chased from a Burger King division and restaurant operations be-
gan in the summer of 1979.30 The business enjoyed a brief success
but soon fell behind in monthly payments to the Miami office. De-
spite prolonged mail and telephone negotiations with the franchis-
ees aimed at salvaging the operation, Burger King terminated the
franchise agreement, ordering Rudzewicz and MacShara to vacate
25. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (1985).
26. Id. at 2178.
27. Id. Burger King Corp. imposes these standards to protect its national image. Id.
28. Id. at 2179.
29. Id. at 2179 n.7. Disputes included rent computation, site development fees, and as-
signment of liability. Id. at 2179.
30. Id. at 2179.
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the premises. When they refused, Burger King brought suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.3'
Subject matter jurisdiction was based on both diversity of citi-
zenship and federal jurisdiction over trademark disputes.3 2 Per-
sonal jurisdiction over the parties was grounded on section
48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes, because Burger King alleged that
Rudzewicz and MacShara had breached their contract that re-
quired monthly payments to Burger King's headquarters in Flor-
ida.33 Rudzewicz and MacShara appeared specially, arguing that
the court lacked personal jurisdiction over them because they were
not residents of Florida and the cause of action did not arise in
Florida. The district court was not persuaded. It held that personal
jurisdiction could properly be exercised pursuant to Florida's long-
arm statute .3  Following a bench trial, the court found that
Rudzewicz and MacShara had breached their franchise agreement
and infringed on Burger King's trademark and service marks.
Judgment was entered against them for $228,875 in damages; they
were ordered to close their Drayton Plains operation and surrender
possession to Burger King.3 5
B. The Decision of the Eleventh Circuit
Rudzewicz appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit, where a divided panel reversed the lower
court's decision." The court noted the judicial confusion on the
issue of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant based
on a contractual obligation.37 The court found that Rudzewicz and
MacShara were within the reach of section 48.193(1)(g), Florida
Statutes, but it went beyond the facial requirements of the long-
arm statute and addressed the due process issues.3 8 The majority
emphasized that, aside from the management training course and
monthly payments to Burger King headquarters, the franchise
agreement provided for no contact with Florida. The only face-to-
face negotiations between the franchisees and Burger King repre-
31. Id. at 2180.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. Costs and attorneys' fees were also awarded to Burger King. Id.
36. Burger King Corp. v. MacShara, 724 F.2d 1505 (lth Cir. 1984), rev'd sub nom.,
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985). MacShara did not join in the ap-
peal. The trademark claim was settled. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2180 n.11.
37. Burger King, 724 F.2d at 1508.
38. Id. at 1508-10.
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sentatives involved personnel from the corporation's Michigan of-
fice." The restaurant was located in Michigan, and all franchise
services were provided by the Michigan office. "To Rudzewicz, the
Michigan office was for all intents and purposes the embodiment of
Burger King. ' 40 Moreover, the franchisees maintained no offices in
Florida and were financially unprepared to defend a suit there. Al-
though the franchisees' activities brought them within the terms of
Florida's long-arm statute, the Eleventh Circuit held that exercise
of personal jurisdiction under these circumstances "would offend
the fundamental fairness which is the touchstone of due process.''41
Judge Johnson dissented, claiming that the court had ignored
binding precedent in determining that Rudzewicz and MacShara
could not be sued in Florida.2 He maintained that the controlling
standard in the Eleventh Circuit, derived from Product Promo-
tions, Inc. v. Cousteau,43 was whether the nonresident "has pur-
posefully availed himself of the ... forum state's laws, whether
the forum state has any special interest in exercising jurisdiction,
and whether the convenience of the parties favors litigating in an-
other state. 44
Each of these criteria, in Judge Johnson's determination, had
been examined and satisfied.' 5 Contrary to the majority's findings,
Judge Johnson found that it was not fundamentally unfair to re-
quire the franchisees to defend a suit in Florida.4 Rudzewicz, a
senior partner in a large accounting firm, was an experienced busi-
ness executive who had initiated and conducted negotiations with
a Florida corporation culminating in an agreement involving over
one million dollars. The specter of the unsophisticated, unsuspect-
ing consumer, obligated through some fortuitous occurrence to de-
fend himself in a distant forum against a corporate Goliath, was
simply inappropriate to the case at hand.4 7
While Judge Johnson correctly asserted that the court was
39. Id. at 1511.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1513. In reaching its conclusion, the court cited In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van
Dusen Air, 466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972), which noted that the revenues and market range of
a local business leave the average franchisee unprepared for litigation in a distant forum.
42. Burger King, 724 F.2d at 1513 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
43. 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974).
44. Burger King, 724 F.2d at 1513 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1514. In his dissent, Judge Johnson referred only to Eleventh Circuit prece-
dents and did not attempt to distinguish the Supreme Court cases cited by the majority.
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bound to follow the analysis enunciated in prior decisions, the
court was not obligated to arrive at any preordained result. Juris-
dictional determinations are necessarily dependent upon the facts
presented in each case. An analysis of the majority opinion reveals
that the approach delineated in Product Promotions was indeed
followed. The factors were simply weighed differently. The major-
ity was more attentive to the local nature of the franchise opera-
tion and the unequal bargaining position which even an exper-
ienced business executive occupies when dealing with one of the
world's largest restaurant organizations.
C. The Decision of the Supreme Court
Burger King appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. Un-
certain whether the Eleventh Circuit had declared section
4 8.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes, unconstitutional on its face or
merely in its application in this particular case, the Court dis-
missed the appeal. Instead, it treated the personal jurisdiction is-
sue as a petition for certiorari. The Court granted the petition and
reversed.8
At the crux of the Supreme Court's decision in Burger King is
the familiar requirement that a nonresident "defendant's conduct
and connection with the forum state [be] such that he should rea-
sonably anticipate being haled into court there."4 The Court de-
termined that no single consideration, test, or "conceptualistic...
theor[y] of the place of contracting or of performance" would be
determinative of jurisdictional questions.50 Recognizing the need
for a more realistic approach toward personal jurisdiction in con-
tract cases involving nonresidents, the Court stated: "It is these
factors-prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences,
along with the terms of the contract and the parties' actual course
of dealing-that must be evaluated in determining whether the de-
fendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the
forum."51
Significantly, the Court said that in general a contract alone can-
not establish the minimum contacts necessary to support personal
jurisdiction,52 but the Court found what it considered to be impor-
48. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2190. The vote was six to two. Justice Brennan wrote the
majority opinion. Justice Powell did not participate. Justices Stevens and White dissented.
49. Id. at 2183 (citation omitted).
50. Id. at 2185 (citations omitted).
51. Id. at 2186.
52. Id. at 2185.
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tant additional contacts between the defendants and the forum
state.53 Rudzewicz had "deliberately 'reach[ed] out beyond' Michi-
gan and negotiated with a Florida corporation."54 The parties spec-
ified in the franchise agreement that it had been entered into in
Miami and was governed by Florida law. Rudzewicz voluntarily ac-
cepted "long-term and exacting regulation of his business from
Burger King's Miami headquarters." 55 Viewing the overall relation-
ship between the parties, the Supreme Court found that the mini-
mum contacts required by due process were present.5
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that forcing the franchisees to
litigate in Florida was decidedly unfair.5 7 He noted that most con-
tacts were with the Michigan office, and that all business opera-
tions were focused there. Despite the majority's holding that the
mere existence of a contract ostensibly calling for performance in
the forum state would not automatically satisfy due process, Jus-
tice Stevens maintained that the Court relied on "nothing more
than standard boilerplate language contained in various docu-
ments" in reaching its decision.5 8 He found the Eleventh Circuit's
reasoning more persuasive than the "superficial analysis" of the
majority.59
As in the Eleventh Circuit's handling of the case, doctrinal dis-
agreements appeared less important than differences in how the
facts were weighed. On a practical level, Justice Stevens' analysis
seems more appealing. Forcing the Michigan franchisees to litigate
in distant Miami posed greater burdens than requiring a multina-
tional corporation to bring its action in Michigan. The burdens of
litigation, however, will always vary from case to case and are not
controlling in jurisdictional determinations.
III. CASE LAW IN FLORIDA BEFORE Burger King
The Supreme Court's holding in Burger King, that the mere ex-
istence of a contract is inadequate to establish the minimum con-
53. Id. at 2186.
54. Id. The Court emphasized that Rudzewicz had initiated contacts with Burger King
in Miami, carrying on continuous negotiations over a period of many months, knowing it
was the Miami office which made the key decisions in these negotiations. Id. at 2186-87. The
Eleventh Circuit, in contrast, had highlighted the role of the district office manager in the
contract formation process. Burger King, 724 F.2d at 1507.
55. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2186.
56. Id. at 2190.
57. Id. at 2190 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. Id.
59. Id.
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
tacts necessary for personal jurisdiction in the forum state, points
up a recurring weakness in how Florida courts apply the state's
long-arm statute in contract cases. Prior to Burger King, Florida
courts had engaged in an expansive exercise of jurisdiction over
nonresidents based on the most tenuous contacts with the state.
The Florida Supreme Court has not construed section 48.193(1)(g),
Florida Statutes, but several district courts of appeal have found
nonresidents subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida based
solely on a contract. Often they have done so without properly con-
sidering the due process issues.
In Engineered Storage Systems v. National Partitions, Inc.,60
the Third District Court of Appeal upheld the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Engineering Storage Systems, a California corpo-
ration which had defaulted on payments to National Partitions, a
Florida company." The court held that section 48.193(1)(g) confers
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who has breached a con-
tract requiring performance within the state, and that it is unnec-
essary to demonstrate any other activity within the state.62
The defendants in Engineered Storage Systems argued that
breach of contract alone, without a showing of other contacts with
the forum state, could not satisfy the due process requirements of
International Shoe. 3 In an opinion by Judge Ferguson, the court
addressed the issue but gave it only superficial treatment in a foot-
note. 4 It concluded that section 48.193 requires only that one of
its enumerated criteria be met in order for personal jurisdiction to
arise. Inasmuch as the defendants met one of the specified criteria,
the court found that maintenance of the suit against them in Flor-
ida was proper. 5 While this reading of the statute may have been
accurate, the decision was hardly responsive to Engineered Storage
Systems' due process argument. No explanation was given of how
the statute, irrespective of its own requirements, conformed to con-
stitutional standards or inherently satisfied the minimum contacts
requirement in this particular case.
60. 415 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 115 n.3.
64. Id.
65. Id. In response to Engineered Storage Systems' due process claims that contacts
other than the agreement between the parties must be shown, the court stated: "We disa-
gree. A reading of the statute to require the doing of more than one of the enumerated acts,
even for the limited purpose of avoiding a perceived constitutional problem, would be
strained." Id.
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In Engineered Storage Systems, the Third District relied upon a
Florida Supreme Court decision in a products liability case in
which the court applied section 48.193(1)(f), Florida Statutes,6 the
provision of the long-arm pertaining to injuries to persons or prop-
erty caused by a nonresident. In that case, Ford Motor Co. v.
Atwood Vacuum Machine Co.,6 7 Ford filed a third-party complaint
against Atwood, a foreign corporation, alleging the defective manu-
facture of a door hinge that Ford had installed in its automobiles.
Atwood moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, con-
tending that Ford's third-party allegations were beyond the scope
of the statute.6 " The supreme court first held that the facts alleged
were sufficient to place Atwood within the purview of the long-arm
statute. 9 It then addressed the due process issues. 0
The court traced the development of the minimum contacts re-
quirements under the due process clause, acknowledging the basic
economic and political structure of the United States as the mov-
ing force behind the need to expand personal jurisdiction in a state
court beyond that state's border. "A manufacturer engaged in in-
terstate commerce," the court reasoned, "which expects its prod-
ucts to be used in other states, can reasonably expect to be held
subject to the jurisdiction of those other states' courts. '71 The su-
preme court therefore upheld jurisdiction under section
48.193(1)(f). It was this holding-that a defendant may satisfy
minimum contacts requirements without engaging in any direct ac-
66. FLA. STAT. § 48.193(l)(f) (1985) provides that personal jurisdiction in a Florida court
may arise by:
(f) Causing injury to persons or property within this state arising out of an act or
omission by the defendant outside this state, if, at or about the time of the injury,
either:
1. The defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities within this
state; or
2. Products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by
the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the
ordinary course of commerce, trade or use.
67. 392 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 1981).
68. Id. at 1307.
69. Id. at 1380.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1312. In his dissent in Ford Motor Co., Justice Sundberg was unable to
"fathom" how the court found reasonable the amenability to suit. He pointed out that, in
World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court had refused to hold that a manufacturer's
product placed in the stream of commerce carried with it an implied consent to personal
jurisdiction. Rather than protecting the Florida consumer, he argued, the holding in Ford
Motor Co. would increase the burden of out-of-state litigation for most citizens while giving
an unfair advantage to national manufacturers, who are readily equipped to litigate in all
states. Ford Motor Co., 392 So. 2d at 1314-15. (Sundberg, J., dissenting).
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tivity within the state-which the court in Engineered Storage
Systems applied by analogy to uphold personal jurisdiction under
section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes. 72
The Second District Court of Appeal rendered a decision similar
to the one in Engineered Storage Systems when it decided Madax
International Corp. v. Delcher Intercontinental Moving Services,
Inc.73 Madax, an Oregon corporation doing business in Europe,
had contracted with Delcher in Florida for the shipment of house-
hold furniture to Belgium. Despite successful movement of the ar-
ticles, Madax refused payment, and Delcher filed suit in St. Pe-
tersburg, Florida.7 " The Second District gave the due process
issues scant consideration in holding that the trial court had per-
sonal jurisdiction over Madax. The court merely recited section
48.193(1)(g), pointed to the allegations placing Madax within its
terms, and concluded that personal jurisdiction was valid.75 Other
contacts with the state were deemed irrelevant because jurisdiction
was claimed under section 48.193(1)(g) for breach of contract,
rather than section 48.181, which required allegations that the de-
fendant had conducted business in the state.76
These cases and others illustrate a rule of Florida law which,
when coupled with the provisions of the long-arm statute, unwar-
rantedly expands jurisdictional limits. Where there is an express
promise to pay and no place for payment is specified, Florida
courts will apply a presumption that payments are due at the cred-
itor's residence.77 When a nonresident then defaults on payments
owed to a Florida creditor, the default is treated as breach of a
contract requiring performance within the state and, regardless of
other contacts with the state, the nonresident is subject to the ju-
risdiction of Florida courts.
These Florida cases involved agreements not only breached in
Florida, but entered into within the state. A nonresident who en-
ters into a contract in Florida should reasonably anticipate being
haled into a Florida court upon its breach. Where the agreement is
executed outside Florida, however, suit within the state is less
72. Engineered Storage Systems, 415 So. 2d at 115 n.3.
73. 342 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1083-84.
76. Id. at 1084.
77. This common law presumption is generally applied in Florida to determine venue in
breach of contract actions. See Madax, 342 So. 2d at 1084; M.A. Kite Co. v. A.C. Sanford,
Inc., 130 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961).
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foreseeable.
In Kane v. American Bank,7 s nonresident guarantors defaulted
on a note issued by a Florida bank. Process was served pursuant to
section 48.193(1)(g), and the defendant filed a motion to quash,
arguing that personal jurisdiction was improper because the guar-
antee agreements had been executed outside Florida.79 Although
the agreement did not specify where payment was to be rendered,
the Fifth District Court of Appeal upheld personal jurisdiction
over the nonresident.80 The court found that the guarantee of a
note given to a Florida bank constituted sufficient contacts to sat-
isfy the International Shoe test. Further, the court reasoned that
it was "certainly within the reasonable expectations of the Guaran-
tor that he will be called upon to honor his promise in the forum
where he intended to cause an effect, where he did in fact cause an
effect, where he promised to perform and where he failed to
perform."81
The Kane decision represents an all-too-common approach
taken by Florida courts in upholding personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident.2 Despite the court's strained attempt to highlight the
significance of the guarantee agreement with the Florida bank, the
contact between the guarantor and the forum state was limited to
a naked contract.8 3 It is unrealistic to assume that a nonresident
should expect to be forced to litigate in a foreign forum based
solely on an agreement consummated outside the state and which
does not express a requirement of performance within the state.
Florida courts have not always been so willing to expand the
reach of the state's long-arm statute in contract cases without
properly addressing due process issues. In Lakewood Pipe, Inc. v.
Rubaii, 4 the Second District Court of Appeal was presented with a
case involving a nonresident corporation which had assumed the
contractual obligations of a Florida corporation, Federal Supply.
As part of the assignment agreement, Lakewood Pipe became
guarantor of Federal Supply's brokerage agreements. When Fed-
78. 449 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).
79. Id. at 975.
80. Id. at 976.
81. Id.
82. See also James Carroll Assocs. v. Video Applications, Inc., 421 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1982) (per curiam) (affirming a decision finding personal jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent who had executed a promissory note outside the state).
83. Kane, 449 So. 2d at 976. The court merely recited the implications of entering a
guarantee agreement.
84. 379 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
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eral Supply filed for bankruptcy, Rubaii asserted his claim for bro-
kerage services and sought to invoke Lakewood Pipe's guarantee.8 5
Although Rubaii's claim came within the literal language of sec-
tion 48.193(1)(g), the court did not uphold personal jurisdiction."
"Even where there is facial jurisdiction under the Florida long-arm
statute," the court stated, "the party over which jurisdiction is as-
serted must have sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to sat-
isfy due process requirements."87 The court found those contacts
lacking in this case.
The court distinguished its earlier decision in Madax by noting
that Rubaii was not a party to the agreement under which suit was
brought.8 The court was unwilling to assert personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident who merely assumed a third party's obligation
to a Florida resident. Although the cases may be distinguishable, it
would have been preferable for the court to have expressly dis-
avowed Madax to the extent that it had held that minimum con-
tacts are automatically present once the long-arm has been suc-
cessfully invoked for purposes of service of process.
The approach of the Second District in Lakewood Pipe was
adopted and refined by the First District in Lacy v. Force V
Corp.89 Force V, a Florida corporation, sued Lacy, a nonresident,
for misrepresentation and breach of a contract to deliver a printing
press in Florida. Lacy claimed that his isolated transaction with
the corporation did not constitute sufficient minimum contacts
with Florida to allow personal jurisdiction in Florida courts.9 °
The court first established that the allegations of a contractual
breach placed the conduct within the applicable section of the
long-arm statute,91 but this determination did not result in an au-
tomatic finding of contacts sufficient to satisfy due process require-
ments. The court then examined the constitutional issues. Al-
though Lacy's contacts with Florida were limited to a single
transaction, they did not necessarily fall short of the constitutional
standards.9 2 The court instead applied standards developed by the
85. Id. at 476.
86. Id. at 477.
87. Id.
88. Id. In Lakewood Pipe, the nonresident merely assumed the obligations under an
agreement entered into by another corporation with a third party. The court was unable to
see this as purposeful availment.
89. 403 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
90. Id. at 1051.
91. Id. at 1052.
92. Id. at 1054.
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Supreme Court in the progeny of International Shoe, stating that
"the single most important factor to be considered is whether the
defendant's conduct and connection with the forum are such that
he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."93
The court stated that determinations of foreseeability where ju-
risdiction is based on breach of contract require consideration of
factors that are not relevant in other types of actions. 4 In a two-
part analysis, the court first examined the case to determine if the
minimum contacts resulted from the defendants' own acts.95 The
court then analyzed the "relative conveniences and inconveniences
of the parties, as well as .. .the basic equities involved in either
prosecuting or defending the suit within the forum."9
The contract between Lacy and Force V required that a printing
press of specific proportions be delivered to the plaintiff in Florida
and that payment be held in escrow until Force V accepted the
machinery.9 7 From these facts the court determined that
"[b]ecause the contract was required to be performed in Florida, it
was not unreasonable from the defendant's perspective to foresee
that an alleged breach of the contract might be litigated in Florida,
or that enforcement of Lacy's rights under the contract might de-
pend on the laws of Florida."98
The exercise of personal jurisdiction over Lacy was upheld, but
only after a thorough examination of the facts; it was not a fore-
gone conclusion once applicability of the long-arm statute was
found. Rather, reasons for exercising jurisdiction were examined
and weighed against the due process rights of a nonresident de-
fendant. The First District's decision in Lacy illustrates the careful
attention courts should give to due process concerns in determin-
ing personal jurisdiction. It stands in stark contrast to such deci-
sions as Engineered Storage Systems and Madax.
IV. CASE LAW IN FEDERAL COURTS BEFORE Burger King
Although federal courts have sometimes been more diligent in
examining due process issues when Florida's long-arm statute is in-
voked in a contract case, they have a checkered record. In diversity
93. Id. (quoting World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286, 287 (1980)).
94. Id. at 1055. The court cited this analysis from Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau,
495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974).
95. Lacy, 403 So. 2d at 1056.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1052.
98. Id. at 1056.
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of citizenship cases, federal courts are authorized to invoke the
provisions of the long-arm statute of the state in which they are
sitting in order to acquire personal jurisdiction over nonresidents. 9
In applying section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes, some federal
courts have properly considered the due process issues. Too fre-
quently, however, they have followed the Florida cases which have
subjected a nonresident defendant to personal jurisdiction merely
on the strength of a contract.
In Thompson v. King,100 the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida considered the exercise of personal juris-
diction over a nonresident who had defaulted on an obligation to a
Florida resident. King, a South Carolina resident, allegedly
breached a contract requiring him to pay $40,000 for Thompson's
interest in a partnership that did business in the United Arab
Emirates. Thompson contended King's failure to make the pay-
ments constituted breach of a contract requiring performance in
Florida. The court found that this allegation was sufficient to con-
fer personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(g). 101 Having de-
termined that the Florida long-arm statute was applicable, the
court stated "there can be no doubt" that section 48.193(1)(g) sat-
isfies due process requirements because "breaching a contract by
failing to perform acts required to be performed within a particu-
lar state creates reasonably foreseeable consequences within that
state."10 Where the defendant deliberately entered a contract re-
quiring payment in Florida, the court found it fair and reasonable
to subject him to its jurisdiction.1 0 3
The district court's discussion of due process requirements
reveals little analysis of the defendant's connection with Florida.
The inquiry into the nature and extent of the relevant contacts
was confined to the contract itself. The court did not explain why
the document and the performance it entailed constituted suffi-
cient minimum contacts with Florida.
In Moltz v. Seneca Balance, Inc.,104 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida had before it an action
against three nonresident guarantors of a promissory note issued
by a Florida maker. The note, part of a stock purchase agreement,
99. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
100. 523 F. Supp. 180 (M.D. Fla. 1981).
101. Id. at 184.
102. Id. at 185.
103. Id.
104. 606 F. Supp. 612 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
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was executed and made payable in Florida.105 Contemporaneously,
three nonresidents executed a guarantee of the note, specifying the
applicability of New York law but not the place of payment. The
defendants objected to the exercise of personal jurisdiction in Flor-
ida, contending that section 48.193(1)(g) was inapplicable and that,
in any event, there had not been the requisite minimum
contacts.'0 6
The court first determined that the Florida long-arm was appli-
cable for service of process because the promissory note had been
executed in Florida and was payable in Florida. Additionally, the
guarantee, which did not specify a place of payment, was presump-
tively payable in Florida.10 7 The court then addressed the issue of
whether the requisite minimum contacts existed between the de-
fendants and the forum state. Without discussion, the court stated
that "Florida law recognizes that a person (or business) who
(which) executes a contract requiring the performance of some acts
in that state does have 'minimum contacts' with the forum."' 0 8
This assertion suggests that the mere applicability of section
48.193(1)(g) by itself satisfies due process requirements, and that
the second tier of the analysis ostensibly employed by the court
was illusory. As in many state court decisions, due process con-
cerns were ignored once the Florida long-arm was successfully
invoked.
The court belatedly attempted to distinguish its decision from
Lakewood Pipe, where minimum contacts were not found despite
the facial applicability of section 48.193(1)(g). In Lakewood Pipe,
the federal court reasoned, the party seeking to assert jurisdiction
was merely a gratuitous beneficiary of a contract with a Florida
resident. In Moltz, the nonresidents themselves had executed con-
tracts requiring performance in the state. 0 9 While this is admit-
tedly a distinction, it does not focus on an important jurisdictional
criterion. A beneficiary of a contract may be treated differently
than the executor, but this does not explain why the act of enter-
ing a contract by itself provides sufficient minimum contacts for
due process purposes.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
105. Id. at 614.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 615.
108. Id. at 616 (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 617. The court also emphasized that the plaintiff in Lakewood Pipe was not a
party to the contract upon which the jurisdictional claim was based.
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and its predecessor, the Fifth Circuit, have shown greater sensitiv-
ity to due process concerns where personal jurisdiction has been
sought against a nonresident defendant in a contract case. This
phenomenon is perhaps best illustrated not by a Florida case, but
by Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau,110 a case arising out of
Texas prior to the Eleventh Circuit being created from the Fifth
Circuit.
Product Promotions, a Texas corporation, had contracted with
the famous marine explorer Jacques Yves Cousteau and his Cous-
teau Group Companies to test a device which Product Promotions
hoped to market."' Upon successful completion of the testing, the
test results and the Cousteau name were used in a nationwide ad-
vertising campaign. Soon after the campaign began, Cousteau's at-
torneys demanded that the commercials not be aired, and they
threatened suit to protect the Cousteau name." 2 Product Promo-
tions then filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas, alleging breach of contract, misrepre-
sentation, and conspiracy to commit fraud.1 3 Personal jurisdiction
was asserted, based on a provision of the Texas long-arm statute
similar to the Florida provision later at issue in Burger King.14
Cousteau's motion to dismiss on grounds of lack of personal juris-
diction was granted by the district court. ' 5 Product Promotions
appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
The Fifth Circuit held that, based on the performance contem-
plated by the contract, the Texas long-arm statute conferred per-
sonal jurisdiction over nonresidents in the Texas courts."' The
court then turned to the due process issues. Following the analyti-
cal framework established by the Supreme Court, the court consid-
ered whether the requisite minimum contacts were present. It also
sought to determine whether these contacts "supported] an infer-
ence that the nonresident defendant purposefully availed himself
of the benefits of conducting business in the forum.""' 7 Although
most of the work under the contract had been performed along the
Mediterranean Coast, the court found that the purpose of the con-
110. 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974).
111. Id. at 487.
112. Id. at 488.
113. Id.
114. Compare TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031 b (4) (quoted in Product Promotions,
495 F.2d at 489, 491) with FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(g) (1985)).
115. Product Promotions, 495 F.2d at 489.
116. Id. at 492.
117. Id. at 495.
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tract and the delivery of the completed work to Texas constituted
sufficient minimum contacts with reasonably foreseeable conse-
quences within the forum state.118
This determination of foreseeability did not end the court's in-
quiry. The court also considered the basic equities and relative
conveniences and inconveniences to the parties.119 Unable to find
that defending a suit in Texas imposed any hardship which rose to
the level of interference with substantial justice or due process,
personal jurisdiction over one of the Cousteau companies was
upheld.120
Of course, another notable decision was handed down by the
Eleventh Circuit in Burger King. There, the court went well be-
yond the facial requirements of section 48.193(1)(g). It delved into
a thoughtful due process analysis that turned on the relative bar-
gaining power of the parties and the burdens of requiring the fran-
chisees to litigate in Florida. 21 The court did not hold that breach
of a contract -requiring performance within the state, by itself,
could never establish personal jurisdiction over the nonresident de-
fendant. Indeed, the court pointedly stated that personal jurisdic-
tion would arise "[wihere commercial parties of comparable bar-
gaining strength contract for performance of manufacturing or
services within that state's bounds" even if the negotiations oc-
curred elsewhere. 2 2 Rather, the court concluded that, given all the
circumstances of the Burger King case, requiring Rudzewicz and
MacShara to defend themselves in a Miami court did not comport
with the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.123
Although the Eleventh Circuit was eventually reversed, that result
was due primarily to the Supreme Court's attaching different
weights to the factors involved in the case. In fact, the Eleventh
Circuit's analysis was quite similar to the mode ultimately em-
ployed by the Supreme Court. As such, the circuit court demon-
strated a sensitivity and sophistication that are benchmarks for
other courts to measure themselves against in the application of
section 48.193(1)(g).
118. Id. at 496.
119. Id. at 498.
120. Id. Personal jurisdiction over some of the affiliated companies was dismissed be-
cause of lack of evidence of an agency relationship. Id. at 493-94.
121. Burger King, 724 F.2d at 1512.
122. Id. at 1513.
123. Id.
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V. THE IMPACT OF Burger King IN FLORIDA
The Supreme Court's decision in Burger King has had an imme-
diate and salutary effect on Florida courts which subsequently
have decided personal jurisdiction questions involving nonresi-
dents in contract cases. Two decisions stand out, Duke Power Co.
v. Hollifield24  and National Equipment Leasing, Inc. v.
Watkins.125
In Duke Power, the North Carolina utility was served with a
third-party complaint by Jacksonville-based Seaboard Coast Line
Railroad, seeking indemnity in a personal injury action under a
1950 contract between Duke and Seaboard's predecessor. Seaboard
relied on Engineered Storage Systems to argue that minimum con-
tacts requirements are not relevant once a prima facie showing of
breach of contract satisfying section 48.193(1)(g) has been made.12
The First District squarely rejected this contention on the strength
of Burger King and held that the contract entered into by Duke
Power did not constitute purposeful establishment of minimum
contacts with the state of Florida. 2 7 Finding the contacts merely
fortuitous, the court declined to "strain all notions of fair play and
substantial justice" and reversed the lower court's decision uphold-
ing personal jurisdiction. 2 '
In National Equipment Leasing, Watkins operated a small busi-
ness in Georgia and entered a lease with National Equipment
Leasing in Atlanta. The lessor later moved to Florida and, when
Watkins failed to make payments, brought suit under section
48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes.129 The Fifth District affirmed a
lower court decision that denied personal jurisdiction over Wat-
kins.1 30 In a well-reasoned concurring opinion, Judge Cowart
explained:
A judicial holding that solely by failing to make contractual pay-
ments due in any foreign state the payor impliedly consents to
submit himself to the jurisdiction of such foreign state and im-
pliedly agrees that it is reasonable to expect him to defend law
124. 471 So. 2d 1365 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
125. 471 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).
126. Duke Power Co., 471 So. 2d at 1366.
127. Id. at 1367.
128. Id. at 1368.
129. National Equip. Leasing, 471 So. 2d 1369, 1369 (5th DCA 1985) (per curiam) (Cow-
art, J., concurring).
130. Id.
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actions in such foreign state, exceeds the bounds of common
sense and reason and of constitutional due process. 3 '
Judge Cowart also attempted to distinguish the decision from
the court's earlier holding in Kane."3 2 The guarantees executed by
the nonresidents in Kane were part of basic loan transactions,
Judge Cowart claimed, which created contacts with the forum and
alerted the guarantors to the possibility of suit in Florida. 13 3 While
this distinction is not wholly persuasive, the court's holding dem-
onstrates a significant departure from its prior course.
VI. CONCLUSION
Florida courts should continue the trend demonstrated in Duke
Power and National Equipment Leasing. A determination that a
nonresident's conduct brings him within the language of section
48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes, may no longer by itself be assumed
to establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a
contract case. That conclusion is only the halfway point in the
analysis. Only where the activity complained of falls within the
purview of the long-arm statute and where the minimum contacts
requirements of due process have been satisfied may personal ju-
risdiction be asserted. If nothing else, the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Burger King underscores the imperative that Florida
courts-and, therefore, practitioners-must address due process is-
sues when considering the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant. No longer may these issues be treated so
cavalierly.
Robert C. Shearman
131. Id. at 1370-71.
132. Id. at 1372.
133. Id.
